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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CANON OF RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
REPUDIATED
Sullivan, a retail druggist, was convicted of violating
§301 (k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
prohibits misbranding of food, drugs, or cosmetics while
"held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce." Sulli-
van bought sulfathiazole tablets from an interstate importer
in bottles properly labeled to meet the requirements of the
Act, which included a caution: "to be used only by or on the
prescription of a physician." In selling the tablets to his
intrastate customers,2 Sullivan put them in pasteboard con-
tainers labeled only "sulfathiazole." The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on
grounds that the Act intended to regulate only the first sale
after the interstate shipment,3 and in part justified its nar-
row interpretation on grounds that if more broadly con-
strued the statute would be of doubtful constitutionality. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed: A retail sale of drugs,
which have been shipped in interstate commerce without re-
producing the label of the interstate container upon the retail
container, is a misbranding in violation of §301 (k). By way
of dictum, the Court stated that a statute should not be nar-
rowly construed because the literal meaning of its words
would raise a constitutional question.4 United States v. Sulli-
van, 68 S.Ct. 331 (1948). (Justice Rutledge concurred; Jus-
tices Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson dissented).
1. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §331(k) (1940).
2. The sales were made to two federal inspectors. Apparently no
defense of entrapment was pleaded.
3. U.S. v. Sullivan, 161 F.2d 629 (C.C.A. 5th 1947). Section 301(k)
was given a liberal interpretation by the Seventh Circuit in U.S.
v. Lee, 131 F.2d 464 (C.C.A. 7th 1942) which held that the bring-
ing together of printed matter containing false and misleading
claims, in the presence of and associated with an article after
shipment in interstate commerce, resulted in a violation of §301 (k).
The courts have repeatedly recognized that the Act was designed
Frimarily to protect the consuming public and should be construed
iberally. See U.S. v. Kordel, 66 F.Supp. 538 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
4. The Circuit Court cited N.L.R.B. v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) and quoted the Supreme Court's statement that:
"We have repeatedly held that as between tvo possible interpreta-
tions of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and
by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save
the Act. Even to avoid serious doubt the rule is the same." See
Circuit Court's opinion at 631.
1948]
INDIANA LAw JOURNAL
A question presented by the dictum in the principal case
is whether the Supreme Court has thereby abandoned a fre-
quently used canon of statutory construction. Justice Bran-
deis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Val-
ley Authority' listed several canons of construction by which
the Supreme Court has avoided passing upon a large part of
all constitutional questions pressed on it for decision. The
seventh rule listed was that "when the validity of an act of
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."'6 This
rule is in effect the same one relied on in part by the Circuit
Court in the principal case. The Circuit Court doubted whe-
ther under its commerce power Congress can prohibit mis-
branding by a retail merchant who is neither shipper nor
receiver of an interstate shipment. The contention of the
government was that the statute, by its literal meaning, in-
tended to prohibit misbranding by all sellers after the inter-
state shipment.7
In rejecting the Circuit Court's use of the canon of con-
struction under discussion, Mr. Justice Black for the major-
ity said: "A restrictive interpretation should not be given a
statute merely because giving effect to the express language
employed by Congress might require a court to face a con-
stitutional question."8 If this dictum is followed, the Supreme
Court in the future will put aside constitutional doubts until
the meaning of the statute is ascertained; and then will pass
on constitutionality. In this event, the Court will not dodge
5. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
6. Id. at 348.
7. As expressed in the House Committee Report, H.Rep. 2139, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 3 (1938), §301(k) was intended to extend the
protection of the consumers "to the full extent constitutionally
possible."
U.S. v. Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., 157 F.2d 453 (C.C.A. 9th
1946) held that under §304 (a) (the seizure section of the Federal
Food and Drug Act) the Federal Security Administrator could not
seize a food which had been adulterated after its shipment in
interstate commerce and while remaining in the original unbroken
package at a terminal warehouse. Following that case, the Ad-
ministrator addressed a letter to the Senate and House, pointing
out that in order to restore the necessary protection to the con-
sumer, Congress should promptly amend §304(a) by inserting
the words "or while held for sale after shipment in interstate
commerce." See Note, 2 Food, Drug, Cosmetic L. Q. 461 (1947).
8. Instant case at 334.
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constitutional questions by choosing of two possible construc-
tions the one which is more clearly constitutional.
An extreme use of this canon was in United States v.
Delaware and Hudson Co.,9 where the Court interpreted the
Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act.10 That Act pro-
hibited railroad companies from transporting in interstate
commerce "any article . . . manufactured, mined, or pro-
duced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in
whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest direct
or indirect. . . . " The acknowledged purpose of the Act
was to force railroads out of the coal production business to
prevent discrimination.1 The Circuit Court held the clause
to be in violation of due process, 12 and the decision was widely
criticized. 13 By a totally unpredicted interpretation, the Su-
preme Court upheld the Act on the ground that the object of
the clause was to prevent carriers engaged in interstate com-
merce from being associated in interest at the time of trans-
portation with the commodities transported. Consequently,
the carriers could continue to mine coal and transport that
same coal as long as it had been sold previous to shipment.
The Court invoked the rule of construction here discussed
stating: "And unless this rule be considered as meaning that
our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional
and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary
because the statute is susceptible of a meaning which causes
it not to be repugnant to the constitution, the rule plainly
must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two con-
structions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.""
The canon has been used as an aid to interpretation in
numerous cases, with the probable result that the meaning
of statutes has been twisted to avoid constitutional questions.
The following cases are examples to illustrate the extreme
use of the canon.
9. 213 U.S. 366 (1909).
10. 34 Stat. 584 (1906). 49 U.S.C. §1 (1940).
11. U.S. v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 380 (1909).
12. 164 Fed. 215 (C.C.A. 3d 1908).
13. For example, see Learned Hand, "The Commodities Clause and
the Fifth Amendment," 22 Harv. L. Rev. 250 (1908).
14. U.S. v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909). For
a criticism of the decision, see Note, 9 Col. L. Rev. 523 (1909).
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A Missouri statute prohibited the defense of suicide by
an insurer when the policy in question was issued. A later
statute under which the insurer was subsequently incorporated
provided that any insurance company "doing business" there-
under would not be subject to any other provisions of the
general insurance laws of the state. In an action by the
beneficiary, the insurer pleaded the suicide of the insured
by way of defense. The Supreme Court interpreted the words
"doing business" as meaning the issuing of policies, and
not the paying of them, saying: "A man does business when
he contracts obligations-he ceases to do business when he dis-
charges them."15 By this unnatural interpretation, the de-
fense was not allowed, thus avoiding the question of whether
the application of the latter statute would be an impairment
of contract.
The Interstate Commerce Act granted authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission to subpoena witnesses and
to inquire into the management of carriers for information
"to enable the Commission to perform duties and carry out
the objects for which it was created."'- Two statutory pur-
poses of the Commission were to keep informed as to the
manner and methods of business by which carriers are con-
ducted, and to recommend additional legislation. The Act
stated that the Commission could require the attendance of
witnesses "from any place in the United States, at any de-
signated place of hearing." The Supreme Court held that
these provisions applied only to a witness called to testify
concerning a specific violation.17 A literal interpretation
would have necessitated a holding upon the constitutional
questions of the extent of Congress' inquisitorial powers,
and their delegability. A later case interpreted another sec-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act by which railroads "sub-
ject to the Act" were prohibited from abandoning operation
without first obtaining permission from the Commission."' A
certain railroad was located wholly within Texas, but three-
fourths of its traffic was interstate commerce. Despite the
fact that the railroad was "subject" to the Act for other pur-
15. Knights Templar Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197 (1902).
16. 24 Stat. 383 (1887). 49 U.S.C. §12 (1940).
17. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 (1908),
cited as authority for the canon of construction used in U.S. v.
Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909).
18. 41 Stat. 477 (1920), 49 U.S.C. §1 (1940).
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poses, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute not to grant
the Commission authority over railroads located wholly within
the state and not connected with any other line."" The Court,
saying that by its restricted construction the "validity will
be undoubted,"20 thus avoided deciding whether, under its
commerce power, Congress can grant permission to discon-
tinue intrastate operations when the railroad is located wholly
within a state.
Section 8 of the Harrison Drug Act 21 provided that pos-
session of specified narcotics by "any person" not licensed
under the Act was unlawful. Although in form a revenue
measure, the Act was passed to control trade in narcotics.22
Mr. Justice Holmes, for the majority, said: "If opium is pro-
duced in any of the States, obviously the gravest question of
power would be raised by an attempt of Congress to make
possession of such opium a crime. ' 23  Consequently, "any
person" was construed to mean only those persons enumera-
ted in another section of the Act as being required to have
licenses, and not any person in the United States. By this
narrow construction the control obviously intended by the
statute, i.e., to control opium addicts, was materially lessened.
On the one hand, there is merit to a presumption that
by enacting a statute any legislative body intends to change
the existing law and, conversely, not to exceed its constitu-
tional powers, thereby doing a futile thing. When the lan-
guage of a statute is ambiguous and where one rational con-
struction thereof might raise questions concerning the act's
constitutionality, it is in line with this presumption for courts
to accept instead a rational construction which appears to
the court less likely to render the act unconstitutional. On the
other hand, the presumption of constitutionality is carried
beyond its logical core when, as is illustrated by the cases
above, the Supreme Court has accepted unreasonably re-
strictive intepretations of statutes in order to avoid more
reasonable interpretations which raise constitutional ques-
19. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U.S. 204 (1922).
20. Id. at 217.
21. 38 Stat. 789 (1914), not in present code.
22. U.S. v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 395 (1916). The bill origin-
ated from the State Department after the United States' participa-
tion in the International Opium Convention.
23. Id. at 401. Mr. Justice Holmes probably doubted the power of
Congress to control local opium production.
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tions. If the Supreme Court in the principal case has aban-
doned its use of the canon of construction under discussion,
the result should be an aid toward determination of true
legislative purpose.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES
RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL
The administrator of an estate applied to the court for
leave to sell realty to pay debts. A bid of $3500 was received
for a tract of 40 acres which the court subsequently ap-
proved. Before the sale had been completed, a second bid
of $3500 was received for 20 of the 40 acres, i.e., an equal
amount was offered for one-half the land. The administrator
therefore filed a petition in court asking that the uncompleted
sale to the first bidder be set aside. The court refused to set
aside the sale and ordered that the deed be delivered to the
first bidder. On appeal by the administrator, the Appellate
Court affirmed the judgment on the ground that the admin-
istrator had no appealable interest. The Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment, holding that the administrator had a
duty to sell real estate for the best obtainable price, and to
that extent at least he was "trustees for the heirs" and as such
was authorized to appeal from the order directing him to sell
at the low price. Ohifest v. Rosenberg, 75 N.E. 2d 147 (Ind.
1947).
The problem before the court in the instant case was
to determine whether the judgment ordering the completion
of the sale to the lower bidder affected the interest of the
estate which the administrator represented in such a way
that he should be allowed to appeal from it. Since there was
no controlling authority on this point,' the problem had to be
resolved in the light of the more general rights of an ad-
ministrator to appeal in his representative capacity.
The rights of a representative to appeal in his represent-
1. In Simpson v. Pearson, 81 Ind. 1 (1869) and Staley v. Dorset, 11
Ind 367 (1858), appeals by administrators were dismissed on other
grounds, implying that orders for the sale of real estate could be
appealed by administrators. However in Hetzell v. Morrision, 115Ind. App. 512 60 N.E.2d 150 (1945), it was held that the admin-
istratrix could not appeal the denial of such an order, but there
were other facts to justify the dismissal of this appeal. Thus
there was no explicit authority on the proposition.
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